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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , : Case No. 860298-CA 
v . : 
RONALD E. WRIGHT and : Category No. 2 
SUSAN-R. RIDING, : 
Defendants-Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Are defendants entitled to reversals of any of 
their convictions on the basis of entrapment? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant 
Wright's convictions of two counts of distribution of a 
controlled substance for value on December 28, 1985? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ronald E. Wright, was charged with four 
counts of distribution of a controlled substance for value, 
second and third degree felonies, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii) (1986) (amended 1987) (W.R. 16-18) .* 
Defendant, Susan R. Riding, was charged with two counts 
of arranging the distribution of a controlled substance for 
value, second and third degree felonies, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 
* Although defendants were tried together, two record volumes, 
one for each defendant, have been filed on appeal. "W.R." refers 
to Wright's record volume, and "R.R." refers to Riding's record 
volume. 
58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1986) (amended 1987)
 f and one count of 
distribution of a controlled substance for value, a third degree 
felony, under § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (R.R. 16-17). 
After a joint bench trial, the court found defendant 
Wright guilty as charged and defendant Riding guilty of the two 
counts of arranging. With respect to the distribution charge, it 
ruled that Riding had been entrapped. The court sentenced Wright 
to the Utah State Prison for terms of zero to five years on the 
distribution of marijuana counts and terms of one to fifteen 
years on the distribution of cocaine and methamphetamine counts 
(the sentences to run concurrently) , and ordered him to pay $315 
to Metro Narcotics Task Force. It sentenced Riding to the Utah 
State Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five years and one 
to fifteen years on the two counts of arranging and fined her 
$2,500, but suspended the prison terms and $1,500 of the fine and 
ordered her to serve thirty days in the Davis County Jail (W.R. 
35-36, R.R. 29-30, S.R. 3). 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State's only witness, Detective Lon Brian of the 
Davis Narcotics Strike Force, and defendants gave conflicting 
testimony at trial. The following facts established through 
Brian's testimony support defendants' convictions. 
On December 28, 19 85 at approximately 6:00 p.m., Brian 
met defendant Riding's stepbrother, Scott O'Brien, at a bar in 
West Bountiful to pursue information O'Brien had provided police 
2
 "S.R." refers to the supplemental record filed with the Court 
on May 18, 19 87. 
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concerning defendants as possible drug suppliers. After 
discussing the possibility of purchasing some drugs that evening, 
Brian drove with O'Brien to defendants' residence where Brian, 
acting undercover, eventually purchased a small quantity of 
marijuana for fifteen dollars from Riding. Before Brian left, 
Riding gave him a price list for larger quantities of marijuana 
and told him that he could obtain more later that evening (T. 5-
13). 
At approximately 10:15 p.m. that evening, Brian and 
O'Brien returned to defendants' residence and made contact with 
Riding at the front door. She eventually escorted them into the 
kitchen where defendant Wright showed Brian a bag of marijuana 
and told him that it would cost seventy-five dollars. Riding 
then handed Brian a small package of cocaine which Wright 
indicated would cost one hundred thirty-five dollars. After 
Brian and Wright agreed on a price of two hundred dollars for 
both the cocaine and the marijuana, Brian handed Wright the money 
in exchange for the drugs (T. 15-20) . 
After the 2 8th, Brian had some contact with Wright in 
person and over the telephone, but no drugs were purchased. 
Wright refused to deliver drugs to Brian in the Kaysville area 
because Wright "didn't like [that] area." However, on January 
17, 1986, Brian went to Wright's residence and purchased 
marijuana and methamphetamines ("crosstops") from him (T. 21-25, 
32, 125-27). 
As noted by defendants, O'Brien did not testify at 
trial, and thus there were no details from him about his 
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relationship with defendants• Wright indicated that he had known 
O'Brien "pretty well . . . for a few years," and had previously 
worked with him for "about two years." He described their 
relationship as a social one (T. 43). Riding testified that she 
had known O'Brien as her stepbrother for about twelve years 
(since the time each was eight-years-old) (T. 68-69), and that 
she had given him marijuana in exchange for money in December 
1985 because he was her stepbrother (T. 77-78). 
Defendants, and their witnesses1 versions of what 
occurred on the dates in question are set forth in defendants1 
brief (Br. of Apps. at 3-8) and need not be repeated here. It 
will suffice to say that the defense witnesses1 accounts of the 
pertinent facts differ in a number of important respects from the 
account given by Detective Brian. 
SUMMARY QF ARgUMEjNf 
Under the statute and Utah Supreme Court decisions 
relevant to entrapment, defendants are not entitled to reversals 
of any of their convictions on a theory of entrapment. They have 
not shown that the tactics used by the police fell below 
standards of acceptable police conduct, or that those tactics 
created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by 
one not otherwise ready to commit it. Both defendants were 
simply afforded the opportunity to commit the offense. 
Defendant Wright's insufficiency of evidence claim 
should be disposed of under State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 
1986), which is controlling on the question he presents. 
ARGUMENT 
PQSNT I 
NEITHER DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE ANY 
CONVICTIONS REVERSED ON THE BASIS OF 
ENTRAPMENT. 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to reversals of 
their convictions because the undercover officer entrapped them. 
After a brief discussion of the law of entrapment in Utah, the 
entrapment claim will be addressed as it relates to each 
defendant. 
A. The Applicable Law 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1) (1978) states: 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
co-operation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
This section is patterned after Model Penal Code § 2.13(1), which 
sets forth a purely objective test of entrapment. See State v. 
Taylor. 599 P.2d 496, 502-03 (Utah 1979); Perkins and Boyce, 
Criminal fraw 1171 (3d ed. 1982). In TaylQI, the Utah Supreme 
Court provided a clear definition of the objective test: 
Under the objective view of entrapment, 
the focus is not on the propensities and 
predisposition of the specific defendant, but 
on whether the police conduct revealed in the 
particular case falls below standards, to 
which common feelings respond, for the proper 
use of governmental power. This concept 
establishes entrapment on its historical 
basis, the refusal to countenance a 
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perversion of justice by government 
misconduct. The objective view provides a 
solid definitive standard upon which the 
defense can rest, i.e., does the conduct of 
the government comport with a fair and 
honorable administration of justice? 
599 P.2d at 500. The objective test focuses entirely on the 
conduct of the police and their helpers; matters such as the 
defendant's character, his predisposition to commit the offense, 
and his subjective intent are irrelevant. IcL. at 503; State v. 
EEickSgn* 722 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1986); State v. Cripps, 692 
P.2d 747, 750 n. 3 (Utah 1984); People v. Barraza, 153 Cal. Rptr. 
459, 468, 591 P.2d 947, 956 (1979); Perkins and Boyce, supra at 
1171.3 
Notwithstanding the clear definition of the objective 
test provided in Taylor, the Supreme Court, in some of its recent 
entrapment cases, has not always been particularly careful in 
applying the objective test, seemingly reincorporating the 
"predisposition" element of the subjective test. For example, in 
State v, Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the Court stated: 
[W]e concluded that the offense was induced 
by the persistent requests by [the undercover 
agent], not fry th3 initiative apd_dgsjre Qt 
680 P.2d at 406 (emphasis added). In St^te vt Cripps, the Court 
J
 The subjective test of entrapment focuses primarily on the 
defendant's predisposition to commit the offense. Taylor» 599 
P.2d at 501. Under this test, the defense of entrapment is 
denied to defendants who had a preexisting criminal intent, no 
matter how overreaching the law enforcement activity may have 
been. State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 151, 369 P.2d 494, 496 
(1962); People v. Mclntire, 153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239, 591 P.2d 
527, 529 (1979) . 
at one point concluded: 
Therefore/ only police conduct that "entraps" 
692 P.2d at 750* These statements/ which do not appear to be 
consistent with either the language of § 76-2-303(1) or the 
interpretation of that statute in laylfli, are at best confusing. 
Presumably/ they are not intended to modify XsxlflX in such a way 
as to create a hybrid objective/subjective test* See CripES* 692 
P.2d at 750 n. 3. fij. I&lQLi 599 P.2d at 504 (Hall/ J.# 
concurring in result)• 4 
* A most recent entrapment decision/ State v. Kaufman/ 52 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 30/ P*2d„_ (1987)/ where the Supreme Court appears 
to have again strayed from a true application of the objective 
test/ drew the following criticism from one legal commentator: 
This case is another decision where the 
Supreme Court speaks in terms of the 
objective standard of entrapment but actually 
applies a subjective standard. Whether the 
offenses were committed because of inducement 
of the undercover officer is not the 
standard. The standard is whether the 
conduct of the officer was such that it would 
induce a person to commit an offense they 
otherwise would not commit. The opinion 
simply does not focus on what conduct the 
officer engaged in that was inappropriate. 
The trial court's remarks appear to be no 
more than sexist gratuities and offer little 
guidance as to what conduct is proper and 
what is not. It is apparent from the 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court that it 
is never going to deal with the objective 
standard of entrapment in the way that 
concept was intended to be applied. The 
better approach would be for the Legislature 
to repeal the entrapment statute and start 
over with a sounder statement of when a 
defendant should be able to claim such a 
defense. 
Boyce/ "Supreme Court Summaries/" Intermountain Commercial 
Record/ Feb. 27/ 1987f at 36/ col. 2. 
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Therefore, it is important for this Court to avoid the 
problems experienced by the Supreme Court in this area and to 
apply the objective test in strict accordance with Utah's 
entrapment statute. Two Supreme Court cases — State v. Martin* 
713 P.2d 60 (Utah 1986), and State v. Erickso^, 722 P.2d at 758-
59 — are excellent examples of the objective test properly 
defined and applied. 
B. anight's Entrapment Claim 
Wright presents two entrapment arguments. First, he 
contends that his relationship with O'Brien and O'Brien's 
stepsister. Riding, was impermissibly played upon by the 
undercover officer during the December 28th drug transaction©. 
He concludes, without reference to anything in the record, that 
"these relationships no doubt indicate that Wright considered 
O'Brien to be a member of his family, and he was thus willing to 
do favors for O'Brien that he would not do for others." Br. of 
Apps. at 20. However, there appears to be nothing in the record 
to support such a conclusion; see State v. Binghanu 684 P.2d 43, 
46 (Utah 1984) (the Court cannot rule on matters outside the 
trial court record); rather, Wright's own testimony indicates 
that his relationship with O'Brien was not a close personal one 
(T. 43). Thus, the "appeals based primarily on . . . close 
personal friendship" condemned in Taylor» 599 P.2d at 503, as 
prohibited police conduct were not present here. The methods 
used by Detective Brian on the 28th simply did not create a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. ty^rtin. 713 P.2d at 61-62. 
Second, Wright claims that Brian's high pressure 
tactics prior to the drug transaction on January 17 constituted 
entrapment* He relies heavily on his own testimony concerning 
Brian's repeated telephone calls and visits even in the face of 
Wright's refusals to sell him drugs, and effectively asks this 
Court to ignore Brian's testimony which suggested that Wright 
gave no indications that he did not wish to sell drugs to Brian 
again. As with any trier of factf the trial court was free to 
accept whatever version of the facts it wished. That it 
apparently chose to believe Brian's testimony and to disbelieve 
Wright's is not grounds for reversing the decision on entrapment. 
State V, UJell, 728 P.2d 131f 132-33 (Utah 1986). £££ SLLZQL fitatfi 
v. Moncada, P.2d , Ut. Ct. App. No. 860243-CA, slip op. at 1 
(filed May 14f 1987). Under Brian's version of the factsf there 
were none of the personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to 
extreme vulnerability present in recent entrapment cases before 
the Supreme Court. Martin. 713 P.2d at 62. See flisa JSlifiJiafillF 
722 P.2d at 758-59. 
In sum, the evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's decisionf does not as a matter of 
law leave a reasonable doubt that defendant was entrapped. 
Mfiilr 728 P.2d at 133. 
C. Riding's Entrapment Claim 
Riding argues that she was entrapped with respect to 
all of her criminal conduct on December 2 8. She relies 
exclusively on her stepsister relationship to O'Brien as a basis 
for this argument. However, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the undercover officer's use of that family 
relationship was unconscionable under the circumstances. 
Riding's arranging of the sale of marijuana and cocaine by her 
co-defendantf Wright, to Brian was sufficiently detached from her 
relationship with her stepbrother that the trial court could have 
reasonably concluded that there was no entrapment. Although the 
relationship to her stepbrother obviously opened the door to the 
subsequent dealings with Brian, it was not used to pressure her 
into committing the offenses in the face of clear reluctance to 
do so. Indeed, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
lower court's decision, the record supports the conclusion that 
there was little or no reluctance by Riding to deal with Brian, 
without regard to Brian's "friendship" with her stepbrother. ££• 
State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 123 8 (Utah 19 80) (where the concern 
was that undercover officers persisted in attempting to purchase 
drugs without any prior reason to believe that the defendants 
were using or selling drugs); People v. Mclntire, 153 Cal. Rptr. 
237, 240, 591 P.2d 527, 530 (1979) (condemning police 
manipulation of an impressionable high school youth to pressure 
his unwilling sister (the defendant) into supplying him with 
marijuana). Brian merely gave Riding the opportunity to commit 
5
 The trial court ruled that Riding was entrapped on the 
distribution charge, but found no entrapment on the arranging 
charges. 
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an offense she had committed before — conduct that does not 
constitute entrapment. S 76-2-303(1). Q£. S£a££_£A_SflIflU£hi£n# 
571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977) (where an officer had made repeated 
requests for marijuana from a student who used marijuana, but 
gave no indication that he would become involved in selling it)• 
Brian's use of the familial relationship, although perhaps 
unacceptable to Riding personally, was not the sort of police 
tactic that falls below acceptable standards. ££fi lazlQLr 5 99 
P.2d at 503. Finally, insofar as the court's finding of 
entrapment on the distribution charge appears inconsistent with 
Riding's convictions for arranging, that is not grounds for 
reversal of the convictions. £Jta££_Y.i._S££B3J:±# 729 P.2d 610, 
611, flD-ifiheatinar 729 P.2d 612, 13-14 (Utah 1986) 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
WRIGHT'S CONVICTIONS OF THE OFFENSES 
COMMITTED ON DECEMBER 2 8. 
Wright argues that, even though Brian may have given 
him two hundred dollars in exchange for marijuana and cocaine on 
December 28, because the State failed to present any evidence 
that her retained any of that money for himself, his convictions 
for distribution of the controlled substances should be reversed 
under jS£3±£^Yx-Qn±iYfiIflSr 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983). The Utah 
Supreme Court recently rejected a nearly identical argument in 
£U££_X.*_Q&2llf 728 P.2d at 133-34 (Utah 1986). That decision, 
which is controlling, requires resolution of defendant's 
insufficiency issue against him. 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendants' 
convictions should be affirmed. 
DATED this _J?£5rday of May, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON / 
Assistant Attorney General 
£££TIEI£&T£_QE_B£ILItfG 
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